Abstract
'If…the ends of men are many, and not all of them are in principle compatible with each other, then the possibility of conflict -and of tragedy -can never wholly be eliminated from human life, either personal or social. The necessity of choosing between absolute claims is then an inescapable characteristic of the human condition. ' Isaiah Berlin 1 At the beginning, the whole world had one language and a common speech. But since the Tower of Babel, or at least so the story goes, languages have been scattered over the face of the whole earth. This raises a question: what is the function of language and is there a benefit to the multiplicity of languages or is diversity merely an historical accident?
Human rights law seems conflicted on the answer.
Major human rights instruments and leading scholars identify two key social values of language: for individuals, language is constitutive of cultural identity (we are what we speak), and for society, linguistic pluralism increases diversity. Since language is central to identity, one's freedom to use one's language is seen as 'inherent' in the 'dignity of the human person', and thus falls within the ambit of human rights law.
2
Because minority groups are more vulnerable in society, they are at a greater risk of losing their languages, and thereby also their distinct identity. Should this happen, injury would be borne both by the minority and by the entire society. For heterogeneity in languages has a positive value: it reflects and enhances cultural diversity, which, in turn, 'enriches the world'. 3 Having decided both that diversity is a positive good and that international human rights law has a role in promoting it, major treaties and leading scholars take the position that the regime ought to enforce the right of linguistic minorities to maintain a high level of linguistic separatism. 4 There is, however, another and perhaps more obvious perspective on the function of language. This function could be called communicative. 5 In this view, language is above all an instrumental tool for communication, and linguistic homogeneity facilitates market cooperation and political unification. Here value is assigned to the smooth operation of the market and the political state, and linguistic diversity is seen as generally imposing costs rather than benefits to society. This is the natural reading of the Tower of Babel story: when God says, 'Come, let us go down and confuse their language, so that they will not understand each other' (Genesis 11:7), he does so in order to impose the cost of confusion, not to bestow the gift of diversity.
In spite of the language of treaties and the writings of scholars, I show in this article that human rights adjudicatory bodies do not, in fact, protect language as constitutive of identity and culture, or in order to encourage diversity. Instead it is the second approach -the communicative -that is actually advanced by these courts and quasi-judicial institutions. The former conception demands strong rights of protection, while the latter inclines toward fair terms of assimilation.
I explain the gap between the broad statements of the discipline and actual judicial practice through the courts' deference to the state and its cost considerations, as well as a functional interest in stability. Following through on the commitment of mainstream human rights treaties and scholars to protect minority language as a mode of self-expression would require making linguistic differences costless to minorities, 6 so that the economic and political opportunities open to minority language speakers would be comparable to those available to the speakers of the majority language with similar characteristics. But, in practice, international human rights enforcement bodies are not prepared to force states to swallow the dramatic cost, financial and otherwise, associated with a robust diversity-protecting regime. In particular, they are not willing to do two things: to allocate the costs of maintaining linguistic difference to the state, and to force the state affirmatively to protect linguistic heterogeneity in the market place by imposing private costs.
In this context of a linguistic laissez-faire policy in the market, courts and quasijudicial institutions only accommodate the language of minorities in three narrow ways.
First, they provide minorities with procedural protection against irrational prejudice that is based on their language status, and they accommodate certain fundamental human rights that are not language-specific but that have an expression in language. This protection is thin and is focused on the needs of individuals rather than groups; it has a strong due process component. Secondly, they accommodate minority languages en route to assimilation into the dominant language and culture of the state.
Protection here is more robust, but is transitory in nature and is geared towards incentivizing the minority to become 'like us' (the majority). A third and final circumstance in which courts protect minority language rights is when doing so is necessary to uphold a pre-existing political compromise between the majority and one or more minority groups. This protection is perpetual and thick. But the scope of positive accommodation is limited and reflects politics and the specific history of the country rather than human rights; it is granted only to the minorities that were part of the original political settlement.
Outside these narrow exceptions, the human rights courts and quasi-judicial institutions continuously allow the state to incentivize assimilation into the dominant culture and language of the majority. The only time they require the state to internalize the cost of linguistic difference is as a transitory measure to assist during the acculturation of the minority. In short, human rights law puts in place strong incentives and pressures toward linguistic and cultural assimilation.
Importantly, the assimilationist character of the jurisprudence does not abandon diversity. These international human rights enforcement bodies may still privilege diversity; they are just not willing to ask the state to pay for it (even if this means that some minority languages will disappear).
Similarly, the assimilationist nature of the law-in-action does not simply support statism at the expense of indifference to human rights. Given that the state is not required to distribute resources based on linguistic distinctions in the market sphere, market pressures will naturally drive society towards linguistic homogeneity. Without intervention in the market to ensure that minority language speakers find employment in significant economic markets, members of the minority who cannot communicate in the majority language might fall behind in the larger economic and political hierarchies of the state. The human rights courts and quasi-judicial institutions ask the state to internalize some of the costs involved in transitioning these individuals into the dominant language of the state and the market. In this strategy of equal opportunity for minorities and majorities groups, these intentional enforcement bodies privilege the normative cause
of equality -what the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights' preamble calls 'the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family'. 7 The result highlights a tension between two human rights values: pluralism and equality (defined in terms of access of the minority). Ultimately, international courts and quasi-judicial institutions fall on the side of the latter.
To make my claim, I systematically examine the way in which the United Nations Human Rights Committee ('UNHRC'), and the European Court of Human Rights ('ECtHR') dispose of cases bearing on language. I selected these two institutions because they are the most significant international human rights enforcement bodies operating today. 8 Both also create rights that are judicially enforceable by individual submission and that lead to decisions that are of general application.
To supplement the discussion, I also briefly draw on the protection of language rights under two domestic courts: the American and Canadian Supreme Courts. I choose 7 ICCPR, supra note 2. 8 The jurisdiction of the UNHRC has become 'a key component in the human rights movement': R. 
1.
Both the UNHRC and the ECtHR adopt a rights avenue to language issues. But the nature of the rights provided is different. For more on the link between the prohibition of discrimination to the positive interest of the Council of Europe in diversity see, e.g., Preamble, European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages ('Realising that the protection and promotion of regional or minority languages … represent an important contribution to the building of a Europe based on the principles of democracy and cultural diversity'); Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Art. 5(1) ('Considering that the creation of a climate of tolerance and dialogue is necessary to enable cultural diversity to be a source and a factor, not of division, but of enrichment for each society').
has also referred to the identity-constitutive role of language: '[l]anguage permits an individual to express both a personal identity and membership in a community'.
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These two functions of language also figure prominently in the writings of leading human rights academics. Given the existing legal framework, we should expect that when members of minorities submit language claims before the UNHRC, the protection that is afforded them will be robust. Equally, we could reasonably anticipate that the ECtHR would be willing to expand Article 14 to provide positive protection for minority languages.
Finally, we would assume that for both bodies, linguistic diversity will be the primary concern and the motivation for protection. 
2.
The reality is, however, quite different. In practice, the UNHRC and the ECtHR do not insist on a minority group's right to linguistic preservation. Despite large differences in the law on the books, courts in these jurisdictions converge in practice on a common standard for the protection of minority language speakers. They do not protect minority language rights as fundamental human rights in the conventional sense of necessarily constraining a state's policy within the sphere of sovereignty. 32 They do, however, accommodate three different, and much narrower, interests that are not themselves language-specific: they enforce minority language accommodation as a subsidiary mechanism to realize another right, as a transitory right for linguistic assimilation, or as the outcome of a path dependent political arrangement positively to protect specific languages in a particular country.
I will now turn to how these interests emerge in case law. While I will provide only one or two examples for each category of protection, these cases and communications are exemplary of decision-making by the UNHRC and the ECtHR (further examples are referred to in the footnotes).
A Subsidiary Protection
In the first category, courts accommodate a minority language when doing so is necessary to promote another universally recognized human right -for example, the procedural right to a fair trial. 35 Ibid., at 6.4. 36 Ibid., at 6.2. 37 Ibid.,at 6.2; ICCPR, Art. 14(3)(a), (f the language in which he will defend himself or in which the trial will be held. This standard ties language to the value of instrumental communication alone.
In contrast, Article 27 confers on linguistic minorities a fundamental right to 'use of their language'. The fact that protected minorities may be bilingual -as many are -is irrelevant to Article 27 protection. Were the Human Rights Committee faithful to this more robust language entitlement, it would have had, at least, to consider whether the accused should be allowed to speak in the minority language, even if he could understand the court's majority language. Guesdon is not an isolated decision; the Human Rights
Committee followed the same reasoning in multiple other communications. 40 In ignoring Article 27 protection, the UNHRC effectively converged on the lower standard of protection of minority language speakers in court settings that is offered by the ECHR. The ECHR does not provide a direct right to the use of minority languages equal to that provided by Article 27 ICCPR. Instead, the ECHR requires language protection only insofar as it is strictly needed for an accused to 'understand' the charges against him. 41 The in total incomprehension as the trial proceeded'. 47 But while the defendant has a right to be 'present at his own trial', 48 he has no right to choose the language he uses in court.
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As with the decisions of the UNHRC and the ECtHR, here, too, linguistic protection ends as soon as the person has become proficient in the majority language.
B Transitional Protection
A second circumstance in which human rights courts and other judicial bodies offer protection to minority languages is when doing so is necessary to assist minorities in their efforts to acquire the dominant language and culture. Here the courts accommodate the minority language, but only as a way to its elimination. The interest in language is purely assimilationist and transitional in nature.
Let us look at the treatment by the ECtHR of minority languages and their speakers in public schools.
In language). But they were barred from joining these classes, as they failed to pass entry exams conducted in Croatian.
In deciding the case, the Grand Chamber explained that 'the decisive factor' of the case was the Roma students' 'lack of knowledge or inadequate knowledge of Croatian, the language used to teach in schools'. 57 As such, 'the central question to be addressed' was 'whether adequate steps were taken by the school authorities to ensure the applicants' speedy progress in acquiring an adequate command of Croatian'. 58 In answering this inquiry, the Court held that Croatia was under an obligation 'to take appropriate positive measures to assist the applicants in acquiring the necessary language skills in the shortest time possible, notably by means of special language lessons'. Like the ECtHR decision in Oršuš, for the US Supreme Court public education means instruction in the majority language: '[b]asic English skills', the judges explained, 57 Ibid., at para. 60. 58 Ibid., at 145. 59 Ibid., at para. 165. 60 Ibid., at para. 60. 61 Ibid. 62 414 US 563 (1974) .
'are at the very core of what … public schools teach'. 63 But, similar to the position of the ECtHR, the state is under an obligation to provide non-English speakers with limited positive linguistic protection to transition them into the monolingual system of education.
And so the decision in Lau called on California to 'take affirmative steps to rectify the language deficiency' of students whose 'inability to speak and understand the English language' excludes them from 'effective participation in the educational program'.
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Yet again, much like the ECtHR, linguistic protection is narrow. Indeed in Rios v.
Read, the US District Court announced that the state's obligation towards the minority students 'is not of indefinite duration'; the purpose of legal protection of minority languages in the public school system 'is not to establish a bilingual society'. 65 The model of linguistic accommodation developed by the ECtHR, just like the American Supreme Court, is, in short, minimal and transitional. The protection presumably lasts only as long as it is needed to prevent irreparable harm to individual students who might otherwise fall behind because of their linguistic status. Minority speakers are accommodated in the public school system, but only to promote their assimilation into the state and the market. As soon as the language barrier is overcome, the right to special linguistic support may disappear.
C Political Protection
A third and final circumstance in which courts protect minority language rights is when doing so is necessary to uphold a pre-existing path-dependent political compromise between the majority and one or more minority groups. In contrast to the interest in 66 Guadalupe, supra note 64, at 1027. 67 Ibid. 68 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 US 390 (1923) ('That the state may…go very far, indeed, in order to improve the quality of its citizens…but the individual has certain fundamental rights which must be respected. The protection of the Constitution extends to all, to those who speak other languages as well as to those born with English on the tongue'); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 US 510 (1925) ('The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations'). minority languages that is directed towards subsidiary or assimilationist ends, this third kind of protection is perpetual and very strong. But, importantly, this thick protection is afforded to only a limited number of languages, and is thus a far cry from a universal human right.
In order to introduce this category of protection, I begin by examining the way in which the Canadian Supreme Court disposes of cases bearing on language conflicts. 79 But this inequality is accepted precisely because it is the product of political compromise and negotiation. As the Chief Justice noted, 'it would be totally incongruous to invoke in aid of the interpretation of a provision which grants special rights to a select group of individuals, the principle of equality intended to be universally applicable to "every individual"'.
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This type of linguistic protection, derivative of an original political arrangement that is specific to the particular history of the country, affords protection only as a collective benefit that is attached to people who are defined as members of the linguistic group.
Thus individualized decision-making as to linguistic identity is unavailable. disputed local legislation prohibiting them from using English in advertising. In its decision, the Human Rights Committee was extremely deferential to the terms of the historic compromise between the majority and minority language speakers in the country.
The Committee emphasized that the objective of the Canadian government 'to protect the vulnerable position in Canada of the francophone group' is 'legitimate'. 84 Indeed, Canada is permitted to choose that only the French language will be used in 'the sphere of public life' in Québec. 85 Like the UNHRC, the ECtHR also differs to the terms of national political settlements reached between linguistic minorities and majorities on the national level.
The treatment of French speakers in Belgium is a case in point. citizens who resided in the Flemish region and were elected to political positions. They had to take a parliamentary oath in Dutch, which they refused to do. They were therefore prohibited from assuming their positions and appealed to the ECtHR.
The Court denied the application and forced the petitioners to conform to the terms of the national bargain. The judges explained that the criterion used to pick the language of oathtaking 'fits into a general institutional system of the Belgian State, based on the territoriality principle'. 89 This system 'is designed to achieve an equilibrium between the Kingdom's various regions and cultural communities by means of a complex pattern of checks and balances' 90 and its 'aim is to defuse the language disputes in the country by establishing more stable and decentralised organizational structures'. 91 This objective, the judges held, is not only 'legitimate in itself', 92 but also 'clearly emerges from the debates in the democratic national Parliament', and 'is borne out by the massive majorities achieved in favour of the Special Act', 93 the legislation that made elections subject to the territoriality principle.
In short, both the UNHRC and the ECtHR are highly deferential to the kind of political community the state seeks to create and to the privileged role of language in this creation. Other authors already described language as 'the crucial criterion of nationality' 94 and an important mechanism through which collectivities, and their individual members, come to visualize themselves as a nation. 95 The two enforcement bodies protect certain fundamental human rights that are not language-specific but that map themselves to language (fair trial or the right to education are examples). But beyond these narrow accommodations, they turn over to the state the job of imagining its community, including its language, or the 'soul of the nation'. 96 The only time the UNHRC and the ECtHR recognize a strong accommodation of more than one national language (e.g., Canada or Belgium), is after a compromise has been achieved on the local level that defines for the Court the state's accommodation of multiple languages -that is, after the majority has already accepted the normative foundations of the language settlement. This recognition, then, is an expression of local politics and historical peculiarities rather than of support for a universal language right. A better way to think about this 'right', it follows, is as a selection mechanism for distributing scarce resources among linguistic communities. 
3.
There are at least two implications for language rights advocates of the gap between the broad official declarations of rights and the much narrower actual judicial practice. First, international lawyers who seek to advance language claims on behalf of minorities before international or national judicial bodies would probably do best by highlighting the communicative rather than identity-constitutive function of language.
This suggests that arguments centering, for example, on access to opportunities ('ability to escape poverty' 97 and 'possibilities for further and higher education or employment' 98 )
will probably lead to more favourable treatment by international courts than arguments that focus on the role of language in the constitution of the self (minority language In addition to implications for advocates, there is a broader normative question underlying this entire area of law -namely, what goals ought we to serve in promoting language rights? Most importantly, is language of value primarily as a mode of cultural self-expression (the good we are protecting is diversity) or as a method of communication (the good we are protecting is the operation of the market and the political state)? These two conceptions of language are both worthy, but they cannot be easily reconciled.
Universal communication between market and political actors -which is necessary for the functioning of the state and civil society -is attained by linguistic homogeneity, which pulls in an opposite direction to that of linguistic diversity. This is an impossible dilemma.
Language rights scholars and advocates square the circle by privileging the identity-constitutive conception of language over the communicative. This foregrounds the minority, the victim of violation, and the cultural realm where the minority generates its self-understanding. 102 They structure an entire debate on the allocation of scarce resources among linguistic communities, without ever talking about the cost of nonassimilation. These costs are dramatic. Given finite resources within a single economy, efforts to accommodate linguistic heterogeneity in the market sphere compete with other legitimate demands. For instance, the funds used to hire instructors to teach in multiple languages could instead be accommodating the needs of students with disabilities.
Human rights treaties and scholarship muddy this question of cost, or counter pressures for linguistic assimilation, in two separate ways. First, the emphasis on diversity as a valuable cultural asset makes cost considerations disappear. Diversity is constituted as a collective good with normative value for the whole society, such that for the average member the gains of diversity outweigh its costs. This approach conceals the direct and indirect interaction between accommodations and their price, and the fact that suggests at least some of the concrete policy regimes that can actualize language rights.
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Each choice of language accommodation is different in the details of its compromises and the stakes involved -the constituencies obliged to the bear the costs of linguistic preservation, and the nature of the costs in terms of both power and resources. 105 While I present these possible policy responses as separate regimes, in reality the divisions between them are rarely cut and dried.
Regime 1: Preservation. In this policy regime, linguistic diversity is construed as intrinsically positive, such that it would result in a worse society were everyone to speak the same language. To bring society closer to this ideal, the state both (i) intervenes in the public sphere to support endangered languages by guaranteeing formal equality to their speakers, so that they are not subject to invidious and malicious treatment, and (ii)
provides strong accommodation and remedies to private actors that use the minority language, so that they do not suffer disadvantageous outcomes in the market and civil society on the basis of their language. An example is a state which, when numbers warrant, subsidizes public education in the minority language and requires employers to hire a certain percentage of minority language speakers. From a distributional perspective, this regime is grounded in the supposition that all of society is invested in diversity, 106 such that all taxpayers within the jurisdiction are asked to pay for linguistic preservation. .. if such costs must indeed be borne in order to ensure the diversity of our linguistic and cultural environment, this may be money well spent, just like devoting resources to environmental equality is widely recognized as a sensible choice').
Regime 2: Tolerance. In this regime, there is nothing inherently desirable or undesirable in linguistic heterogeneity; the state is neutral towards linguistic heterogeneity as a value. It picks the majority language as the sole lingua franca of the public sphere but tolerates linguistic multiplicity in the private sphere (possibly because the costs of eradicating it outweigh the likely benefits). As a result of privatizing all linguistic decisions in civil society and the market, the possibility of diversity is maintained in the private realm. For instance: the state would subsidize public schools that use the majority language and would permit, but not finance, the operation of private schools in other languages. Here, the minority bears all the costs of maintaining its separate language. Some of these costs are direct -for example, paying for private schools that use the minority language as the medium of instruction. Other costs are indirect -for instance, if members of the minority fail to master the majority language they may be penalized in the market place. Because of the costs associated with speaking the minority language, over time members of the minority may choose to integrate into the dominant language of the state. But the state remains passive in these processes of assimilation.
Regime 3: Assimilation. In this scheme, the state actively intervenes in order to incentivize assimilation into the dominant language and culture. As in a tolerance policy, the state imposes the majority language as the common language of public, but not private, communication. Thus heterogeneity in languages is maintained in civil society and the market. But now the state also takes positive steps to ensure that minorities assimilate into the dominant language. Again, a good illustration is education: the state would provide public schooling only in the national language and allow parents to opt out and to operate private schools in minority languages. But the state might also provide special accommodations -such as smaller classes, extra language lessons, private tutoring, etc. -to assist minority language speakers in mastering the majority language.
The existing international human rights regime is vague enough to sustain all three broad schemes for the protection of minority languages -preservation, tolerance, and assimilation. Ultimately, absent a pre-existing national settlement that honours a thick form of diversity, and despite significant doctrinal differences in the law on the books, the UNHRC and the ECtHR, I have argued, converge on the assimilationist regime: they allow the state actively to incentivize the assimilation of the minority into the dominant language and culture of the public sphere. In addition, they also demand that the state spend public resources both to provide narrow procedural guarantees for non-majority language speakers, such as ensuring that they are not subject to irrational bias based only on their linguistic status, and to protect the difference of linguistic minorities when language becomes an issue in other substantial (non-cultural) commitments of human rights law (e.g., due process). In this, these international enforcement bodies ask the state to bear some of the costs associated with the language transition. There is, therefore, at least some transfer of resources from the majority, whose language is being learned, to the minority that needs to acquire the majority's language. 107 Minorities are welcome to remain different and to preserve their separate linguistic identity; however they must internalize all the costs of maintaining their difference. 108 Major human rights enforcement bodies refuse to allocate the cost of difference to the state (even if this means that some minority languages will disappear).
This is very close to the American model -a regime that recognizes no substantive language rights and views language difference in transitional and anti-discriminatory terms. These courts and quasi-judicial institutions set a floor (which resonates with the American model) on the protection afforded to linguistic minorities; they do not set a ceiling. The state is free to give greater rights to some linguistic minorities (as in Canada), if the majority deems it appropriate in light of the state's particular historic, economic, cultural, and political constraints.
The resulting regime carries some significant economic and political benefits, fairness (which guarantees access on fair terms to the market and the state, ensures narrow procedural justice, and demands sharing the cost burden of language assimilation with the majority). This may have the best chance of producing politically feasible and economically practical solutions to the multiplicity of languages within a state. At the same time, the limited character of the jurisprudence is also a boon to one important cluster of human rights: rights to equality of access of the minority group in the market and in political processes. However, while the ensuing order is grounded in a normative commitment to equality of opportunities for minorities and majorities, it also permits the state actively to incentivize minorities to become 'like us'. This, clearly, does not embody diversity. Ultimately, then, the commitment of human rights to pluralism is, at best, skin deep.
